Policy Integration Across Multiple Dimensions: the European Response to Hybrid Warfare by Stoian, Valentin
www.ssoar.info
Policy Integration Across Multiple Dimensions: the
European Response to Hybrid Warfare
Stoian, Valentin
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Stoian, V. (2019). Policy Integration Across Multiple Dimensions: the European Response to Hybrid Warfare.
Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 19(3-4), 411-440. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-68415-2
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0
 
Policy Integration Across Multiple 
Dimensions: the European Response to 
Hybrid Warfare 
 
VALENTIN STOIAN
*
  
(“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy) 
 
 
Abstract 
The article analyzes the European Union’s response to hybrid warfare and argues that a 
proper interpretation of the policies adopted offers cautious support for a rational choice 
intuitionalist approach. It begins with the presentation of the main theories of European 
decision-making, among which rational choice and constructivist institutionalism and it 
derives a hypothesis which it tests in the third part of the article. Several policy 
documents are analyzed in order to provide the empirical material for the analysis. The 
article concludes that EU institutions prefer to undertake supra-national action in 
technical fields which are less politically controversial and where supra-nationalization 
is more easily accepted. 
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Introduction 
 
The 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, as well as the 
beginning of the Donbas conflict represented a relevant turning point in EU 
policy making. These challenges required a response from the institutions of the 
Union, given that two member states, Latvia and Estonia share a direct border 
with the Russian Federation, while others, such as Romania and Bulgaria have a 
coastline on the Black Sea. In 2016, the European Commission and the High 
Representative presented to the European Parliament a policy document entitled 
the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats,
1
 which included a varied set 
of replies to the evolving challenge.   
                                               
*  Valentin Stoian is a researcher in Political Theory with the “Mihai Viteazul” National 
Intelligence Academy (valentin.stoian@animv.ro, stoian.valentin@animv.eu). 
1  European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, “Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: ‘Joint 
Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response’,” JOIN(2016) 18 
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The concept of “hybrid warfare” was coined to describe the tactics that 
Russian Federation employed against NATO and the EU states.
2
 While it has 
been heavily criticized in the literature,
3
 “hybrid warfare” captures, to some 
extent, the diversity of means that the Russian Federation has employed. The 
Russian strategy in Crimea used a combined set of military, economic and 
information warfare,
4
 which helped the Russian Federation obtain a quick victory. 
Furthermore, the use of information warfare was documented in the 2016 US 
elections,
5
 as well as in the Brexit referendum that took place the same year. 
Other, less intrusive attempts at interference occurred in the case of the 2017 
Italian elections,
6
 as well as in the 2018 Hungarian ones.
7
 The most recent 
incident was the attempted assassination of the ex-GRU colonel, Serghei Skripal 
and of his daughter Yuliya, that took place in Salisbury, UK as well as the 
attempted sabotage of the investigation into the incident by the Russian GRU.
8
  
The article will analyze the European Union’s policies for combating 
hybrid warfare through the lenses of contemporary European decision-making 
theories and will argue that the re-emergence of the Russian threat has provided 
the supra-national institutions of the Union with an opportunity to assert and 
even extend their power. The article will argue that policies adopted to combat 
Russia’s hybrid warfare offer support for a rational-choice institutionalist 
perspective of interpretation of European decision-making. The analysis will 
                                                                                                                   
final, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN. 
2  Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern 
Europe,” International Affairs 92, no 1 (2016): 175-195,  Martin Kragh and Sebastian 
Åsberg, “Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: 
the Swedish case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no 6 (2017): 773-816. 
3  Bettina Renz, “Russia and ‘hybrid warfare’,” Contemporary Politics 22, no 3 (2016): 283-
300. 
4  Tony Balasevicius,  “Looking for Little Green Men: Understanding Russia  s  
Employment of Hybrid Warfare”, accessed June 13, 2018,  
http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/1227f31f-370a-
4051-83ca-3a04f97932be/pdf. 
5  House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report on RuSsian Active 
Measures,” March 22, 2018, accessed June 10, 2019,  https://docs.house.gov/mwg-
internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=n65m50GVLvqRylNukkZqFsYqIKLxv9JJI5J4RbV7
72k.  
6  David Alandete and Daniel Verdú, “How Russian networks worked to boost the far right 
in Italy,” March 1, 2018,   accessed June 13, 2018, https://elpais.com/elpais/ 
2018/03/01/inenglish/1519922107_909331.html.  
7  Katalin Andor et al., “The impact of Russia’s state - run propaganda apparatus on online  
media in Hungary - 2010–2017,” March 2018, accessed June 13, 2019,  
http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/crcb_2017_mrsrpphnm_English_180319_.pdf.  
8  Government.nl, 2018, “Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service disrupts 
Russian cyber operation targeting OPCW,” accessed July 20, 2019, 
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/10/04/netherlands-defence-intelligence-and-security-
service-disrupts-russian-cyber-operation-targeting-opcw.    
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rely on a set of policy documents issued by the European Commission and will 
employ process-tracing in order to describe the development and trace the 
evolution of the European Union’s policies for combating hybrid warfare.  
The first part of the article will describe the theoretical framework which 
the article will employ. It will describe the main tenets of Ernst Haas’ 
neofunctionalism and the concept of spill-over, rational choice and 
constructivist institutionalism and will derive the hypothesis that will be tested 
in the empirical part of the article. Further, a short presentation of the decision-
making mechanisms under co-decision and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy will be outlined. The theories presented will be compared on the basis of 
their conceptualization of the actors and of the way they predict actor behavior 
in the face of a policy challenge.  
The second part of the article discusses theories of European decision 
making, while the third presents process tracing and shows how the article 
employs this methodology in order analyze the European Union’s policies for 
countering hybrid threats. The fourth section will present the state of the EU's 
policies as they have developed since the 2016 adoption of the Joint Framework 
on countering hybrid threats.
9
  The last section of the article will assess whether 
the hypothesis tested has been confirmed or rebutted by the empirical material. 
Furthermore, it will argue that the empirical material presented lends evidence 
to support a rational choice-institutionalist interpretation. The article’s main 
finding is that both rational choice and constructivist institutionalism would 
predict an expansion of the power of supra-national institutions, but the former 
can better explain why supra-national integration is primordially achieved in 
technical and scientific policy areas.  
 
 
Theories of European Decision-Making 
 
The following section will present an overview of three theories of 
European decision-making. It will discuss both their ontological fundamentals 
and their conceptualization the policy adoption process. Then, the architecture 
of European decision-making will be briefly presented, in order to understand 
the institutional positions of actors involved in combating hybrid threats and the 
incentives and identities that these operate under.  
The main argument of the classical theory of neo-functionalism is that 
trans-national cooperation in a particular field leads to increased cooperation in 
                                               
9  European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, “Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: ‘Joint 
Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response’,” JOIN(2016) 18 
final, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT 
/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN. 
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other policy fields, in a process called spill-over. According to this view, once 
cooperation between actors begins, it leads to an increased demand for 
regulation, which also supports cooperation in other fields and, which, in turn 
leads to more demand for regulation. According to Sandholtz and Sweet,
10
 the 
process of integration takes place through “spillover” effects from one policy 
area to another.  
 The authors define the idea of “spillover” as “spillover occurs when 
actors realize that the objectives of initial supranational policies cannot be 
achieved without extending supranational policy-making to additional, 
functionally related domains.”
11
 This is similar to the definition offered by 
Philippe Schmitter in 1969, who argued that spillover is “the process whereby 
members of an integration scheme - agreed on some collective goals for a 
variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals - 
attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction by resorting to collaboration in another, 
related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying 
their commitments to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual 
commitment), or both.”
12
  
 Another fundamental concept in the neo-functionalist theory is the idea 
of “stickiness.” This means that rules, once enacted, create a series of actors 
interested in their maintenance. Thus, once a set of interests has been 
institutionalized, it becomes very difficult to roll them back given that actors 
have vested interests in defending them.
13
  
Yet another result of integration is, in the view of neo-functionalist 
analysts, the emergence of supra-national interests. Not only do actors such as 
Member States or interest groups at the sub-national level (commercial 
interests, trade unions, political parties) cooperate at an accelerated rhythm, but 
the creation of supra-national institutions generates an interest that these have to 
perpetuate and increase their own power. Supra-national institutions generate 
positions, are served by a well-paid bureaucracy and act as places of elite 
socialization, where previously nationally-minded elites need to adopt a 
“European” identity. These institutions themselves then drive the integration 
process, aiming to extend their competences, both at the expense of Member 
States and at the expense of each other.
14
 One example quoted in the literature is 
the pan-European networks of interests that the European Commission 
                                               
10  Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and supranational 
governance,” in Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 1-19.  
11  Sandholtz and Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and supranational governance,” 15.  
12   Carsten Stroby Jensen,  “Neo-functionalism” in  Michelle Cini, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano 
Borragán (eds.), European union politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 71-86.  
13  Sandholtz and Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and supranational governance,” 16.  
14  Jensen, “Neo-functionalism,” 92.  
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assembles regularly, with the aim of proposing “European” solutions to 
problems and thus increasing the power of the Commission to the detriment of 
that of national governments.
15
 A further example could be observed in the 
2018 State of the European Union address by Commission president Jean 
Claude Juncker who argued for the increase use of Qualified Majority Voting in 
European Security Policy.
16
 This would severely restrict the power of the 
Council of the European Union and of Member States that are represented in it, 
as foreign security policy represents the last policy field where a unanimity is 
needed to adopt decisions.  
Classical neo-functionalism does not take any stand on ontological 
debates. Spill-over effects can be generated either by a set of rational actors 
taking advantage of the economies of scale generated by a wider market or by a 
process of common identity formation through socialization in supra-national 
institutions. Given its ontological silence, neofunctionalism can be adapted by 
both rationalist and constructivist inspired conceptions.  
 The second theory of decision-making that the article employs to 
understand the development of EU policies aimed to combat hybrid warfare is 
rational-choice institutionalism. Developed by Jon Elster, Douglas North and 
Ronald Coase, rational choice institutionalism argues that actors are, at least 
instrumentally, rational. This means that they are able to identify a certain goal 
(at the most basic level, the theory assumes that actor goals are relatively 
invariant and they can be subsumed under the idea of power maintenance and 
maximization) and optimize the means in order to achieve it. Furthermore, 
actors’ rationality is bounded, in the sense that they employ the minimum 
required effort to acquire the information necessary for a decision and employ 
heuristic devices such as “rules of thumb, standing decisions, stopping rules, 
and satisficing.”
17
   
 Rational-choice institutionalism embraces a positivist epistemology. 
Under its assumptions, the world is “composed of discrete objects that are 
independent from the observer”
18
 and objective trends and phenomena exist and 
are identifiable by the respective observer. Thus, actors and their strategy are 
easily identifiable by the researcher and the result of their bargaining can be 
analyzed after a judicious coding of their initial preferences and the policy 
outcomes.  
                                               
15  Jensen, “Neo-functionalism,” 92, Sandholtz and Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and 
supranational governance,” 17.  
16  Jean-Claude Juncker, “State of the European Union 2018,” September 2018, accessed July 20, 
2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/state-union-speeches/state-union-2018_en. 
17  Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational choice institutionalism” in R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. 
Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of political institutions 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008):  24-26. 
18  Ariadna Ripoll-Servent,  Institutional and policy change in the European Parliament: 
Deciding on freedom, security and justice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015), 7.  
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Within this context, institutions (understood as sets of rules) represent 
either constraints on actor behavior or equilibrium results when a phase of 
institutional change occurs. They represent constraints in the sense that they 
determine the “rules of the game”, under which the actors pursue their rational 
goals. Therefore, according to this interpretation of rational-choice 
institutionalism, institutions limit or aid what an actor can do when attempting 
to achieve his goals (increase or decrease transaction costs, determine that an 
actor must include the interest of another in his decision-making, simplify 
information flows).
19
 The simplest understanding of rational choice 
institutionalism has been presented as: “goal-oriented actors operat[e] within 
institutional constraints”,
20
 where actors form their preferences exogenously.  
According to rational choice institutionalism institutions can also 
represent equilibrium results. On this view institutions are not exogenous 
constraints, but the results of interaction between rational, power-maximizing 
actors. Thus, they reflect the power balance between particular actors at a 
particular time. Thus, when a new rule is made, actors’ bargain and the 
preferences of the stronger actor prevail and are institutionalized.
21
  
Conversely, constructivist institutionalism employs a post-positivist 
epistemology and an interpretive methodology. According to this view, social 
entities “do not exist as an external unit but are socially constructed through 
perceptions, norms and discourses of social actors.” Thus, according to the 
proponents of constructivist institutionalism “social entities and actors are 
‘mutually constituted’: structures, such as ideas and norms, constitute actors and 
their interests, but actors can also change and reformulate structures.”
22
  
According to constructivist institutionalism, there is a much closer 
relationship between actors and structures, who are not necessarily separated. If, 
in the case of rational choice institutionalism, actors adapt their strategies to 
existing institutions, when constructivist frames are applied, the relationship 
thins. On the one hand, actors are defined by values and narratives, while, on 
the other, institutions are built to embody particular views of the world. Actors, 
according to this view, are defined by interests which are “social constructions 
that cannot serve as proxies for material factors.”
23
 Thus, actors do not have 
exogenous preferences, they form preferences in relationship with the 
institution they operate under, by partially adopting the narrative of the 
institution. Alternatively, institutional change occurs when particular actors 
                                               
19  Shepsle, “Rational choice institutionalism,” 25.  
20  Ripoll-Servent, Institutional and policy change, 44. 
21  Shepsle, “Rational choice institutionalism,” 27. 
22  Ripoll-Servent, Institutional and policy change, 7. 
23  Colin Hay, “Constructivist Institutionalism”, in  Rhodes, Binder and Rockman (eds.), The 
Oxford handbook: 56-74.  
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manage to frame a particular issue in such a way in which it is accepted by 
enough other actors to institutionalize it.  
According to Ripoll Servent,
24
 under constructivist institutionalism “the 
translation from policy preferences into policy outputs is done using framing as 
a mechanism for change.” Thus, actors jockey to provide the most acceptable 
understanding of events through framing, which is understood as the process 
during which “definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with 
principles of organization which govern events (...) and our subjective 
involvement in them.”
25
 Frames compete among each other and are carried 
through by frame entrepreneurs, who push their own frame and attempt to 
modify the competing frames in order to achieve consensus on a particular 
issue. The position of the frame-entrepreneur within the system of symbolic 
power is crucial: a previously held position of power and the ability to show 
knowledge of a particular issue allows a frame entrepreneur to better adjust the 
framing of an issue to his or her preferred position.
26
  
To summarize, the goal of constructivist institutionalism is to identify 
how, in the competition of ideas, some get institutionalized, while others get 
eliminated. According to Colin Hay “constructivist institutionalism thus seeks 
to identify, detail, and interrogate the extent to which—through processes of 
normalization and institutional embedding—established ideas become codified, 
serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret 
environmental signals.”
27
  
Combating hybrid warfare takes place across several policy fields, each 
falling under a different decision mechanism. This makes the analysis of the 
comprehensive policy package extremely difficult, since each policy generates a 
different requirement for inter-actor agreement and a different “game” to be played 
between different actors. Within this policy package, several decisions involve the 
adoption or better implementation of EU-wide legislation (directives or 
regulations), others imply actions coordinated by the Commission but implemented 
by Member States, some are applied by the Commission’s own agencies and 
subordinated institutions, while yet others, come under the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, which is adopted unanimously by the Council of the European 
Union, based on a proposal from the High Representative. 
Based on this short presentation of the EU's policy areas, one can define 
four ways in which EU institutions can act. These will be used in the analysis of 
the actual policies adopted by EU institutions. The first and most clear type of 
action EU institutions can take is the adoption of supra-national legislation 
through the ordinary legislative procedure or other similar procedures. The 
                                               
24  Ripoll-Servent, Institutional and policy change, 49. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid, 50. 
27  Hay, “Constructivist Institutionalism,” 65.  
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second option is the inter-governmental adoption of policies, which is a 
requirement in foreign and security policy. The third is supra-national action at 
below the legislative level through, for example, the use of one of the 
Commission's agencies or services to elaborate guidelines or to implement 
changes to its own mode of operation. Finally, the fourth and the least “supra-
national” of them is the coordination of national policies whereby the 
Commission only adopts the role of a mediator and coordinator between the 
national governments.  
The main aim of the article is to investigate whether rational-choice or 
constructivist institutionalism better explain the EU institutions’ actions in 
combating hybrid warfare. In order to do this, it formulates a hypothesis based 
on the two theories.  
Rational choice institutionalism claims that actors seek to maximize 
power but that they will take the minimum required risks. Thus, supra-national 
actors such as the Commission or the High Representatives will undertake 
policy initiatives in “technical” fields, which are governed by specialized 
personnel and where member states benefit considerably from increased 
cooperation. Thus, supra-national institutions will seek to present “unity” in 
front of an external threat but aim to supra-nationalize power in policy fields 
where less controversy is to be expected.  
Alternatively, constructivist institutionalism sees actors as defined by 
their identity. In this case, where the Russian Federation is primordially defined 
as a “non-democratic” threat which is opposed to the “civilized West”,
28
 supra-
national actors will make a “stand” in crucial foreign and domestic policy 
initiatives, which aim to reinforce the “democratic values” narratives held by 
European institutions. The existence of an “external threat” will allow the 
Commission or the High Representative to centralize power to the detriment of 
Member States in domains previously reserved to national prerogative such as 
foreign policy.  
The article aims to test the following hypothesis, whose confirmation 
would lend support to rational choice institutionalism. Alternatively, evidence 
against the hypothesis would lend credence for constructivist institutionalism  
 In the context of hybrid warfare, the EU’s supra-national institutions 
initiate policies in more “technical” and less “political” fields of policy-making.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
Process - tracing aims to explain a certain policy result by determining 
and thoroughly investigating the relevant moments which brought it about and 
through the evaluation of potential explanations for that outcome. According to 
                                               
28  Glen Diesen,  EU and NATO Relations with Russia: After the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union, (London: Routledge, 2015). 
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Bennett and Checkel, process-tracing relies on the “examination of intermediary 
steps in a process, in order to examine how that process took place and if that 
process led to a relevant result.”
29
 Similarly, according to Collier, process-
tracing is similar to historical investigation, in the sense that relevant episodes 
are arranged in a temporal sequence.  
Process-tracing can be used either to explain pre-existent theories or, in 
the absence of a theory to generate relevant hypotheses, to analyze crucial 
moments which led to the relevant result. If a higher-level theory is not used as 
an explanatory framework, an alternative is presenting competing hypotheses 
which explain the final result and testing them on relevant moments. From the 
point of view of data collection, process - tracing employs: 1. Document 
analysis 2. Interviews with political decision-makers 3. The analysis of relevant 
statements by political decision-makers, especially those made before relevant 
decision-making moments (which will be compared to the results of those 
decision-making processes- for example, negotiations that lead to the adoption 
of a particular treaty). According to Robinson the aim of process-tracing in the 
case of specific episodes is to investigate the way in which “particular 
configurations of idealized factors were combined in order to generate specific 
results.”
30
  
 Bennett
31
 describes process-tracing as “retroactive scenario analysis” 
and identifies a number of similarities between the two. Both are interested in 
small-scale decision-making, aiming to investigate what were or what will be 
the choices made by high-level officials, especially under the influence of 
external stimuli. However, the main difference between the two lies in their 
time-orientation: scenario analysis looks to identify potential future 
developments, while process-tracing looks towards the past in order to evaluate 
the relative importance of the determinants of a particular event. According to 
Punton and Welle,
32
 process-tracing requires five stages:  
 
1. Elaborating a hypothesis on the causal mechanism which achieved a particular result. 
This can involve the use of higher-level theories which allow for the generation of 
hypotheses or simply the enumeration of the potentially relevant determinants.  
                                               
29  Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic tool, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 20. 
30  Corey Robinson, “Tracing and explaining securitization: Social mechanisms, process 
tracing and the securitization of irregular migration,” Security Dialogue 48, nr. 6 (2016): 
505–523. 
31  Andrew Bennett, “Using Process-Tracing to improve Policy Making: the (negative) case 
for the 2003 Intervention in Iraq,” Security Studies 24, nr 2 (2015): 228-238. 
32  Melanie Punton and Katharina Welle, “Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps,” 2015, 
accessed October 3, 2019, https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/ 
123456789/5997/CDIPracticePaper_10_Annex.pdf;jsessionid=8AAF83A109DB2372F41
2BC6CA0B67656?sequence=2. 
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2. The operationalization of the causal mechanism involves identifying the observable 
manifestations of a mechanism and of the empirical evidence which would allow us to 
state that the particular chain of events that the causal mechanism predicts actually took 
place.  
3. The collection of empirical data through interviews or document analyses.  
4. The evaluation of the explanatory power of each piece of evidence and the 
identification of their relevance (does it support, confirm, weaken or invalidate the 
theory).  
5. The elaboration of conclusions on whether the hypothesized mechanism produced the 
particular result.  
 
The article uses process - tracing based on document analysis. Thirteen 
relevant EU policy documents have been identified, which outline the plans and 
the progress of the European Union in combating hybrid threats. A wide 
approach was used, and the documents included did not refer only to hybrid 
threats per se, but also to specific areas of hybrid warfare such as 
disinformation and to specific measures adopted, such as creating resilience. 
The wide approach led to the inclusion of other policy documents such as the 
code of conduct for online platforms.  
A system of analysis was elaborated which included the actors relevant 
for a particular action, as well as its nature (either a form of coordination of 
inter-governmental cooperation, inter-governmental policy making or the use of 
supra-national legislation) and a coding of the policy field in which the action is 
undertaken. Policy fields were coded as either “technical” or “political”, 
depending on whether they are more or less contested by relevant actors. The 
goal of this analysis is to identify whether supra-national action is carried out in 
more “technical” or more “political” fields of policy-making when combating 
hybrid threats. Finally, policy implementation steps were arranged in a 
chronological order, with the aim of identifying relevant junctures in policy 
roll-out and to form an overall picture on the evolution of the combating of 
hybrid warfare. Table 1 presents, the analysis of the policy documents which 
the European Union has issues on the topic of hybrid warfare.  
 
  
EU Policies - Combating Hybrid Warfare 
 
The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the ignition of 
the Donbas war were first reflected in EU documents in a food-for-thought 
paper initiated by the External Action Service in May 2015 in preparation for 
the Foreign Affairs Council that month.
33
 This document
34
 suggested that the 
                                               
33  Council of the European Union, “European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – 
Conclusions,” accessed July 13, 2019, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/03/20/conclusions-european-council/, 2015. 
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Russian Federation's rapid victory over Ukraine was caused by the latter state’s 
extensive vulnerabilities. According to the document, Russia’s hybrid warfare 
(defined as the centralized use of both covert and overt tactics) exploited 
Ukraine’s vulnerabilities such as:  
 
(i) weak governance and national institutions, wide-spread corruption; 
(ii) lack of trust and support for security and defense structures; 
(iii) the presence of a large Russian speaking population that perceived itself 
marginalized; and 
(iv) critical dependency on Russia for imports and energy supply.”35  
 
The food-for-though paper sees two steps in answering this challenge - 
the improvement of awareness capabilities (of both hybrid actions as well as 
one's own vulnerabilities), followed by the increase of resilience (diminishing 
one's vulnerabilities in order to better withstand stress and catastrophe). In order 
to achieve these goals, the document foresees a form of self-evaluation of 
vulnerabilities from the part of Member States, EU support through CSDP 
missions in neighboring states in order to increase resilience as well as 
cooperation with NATO (considering that the EU does not have mechanisms to 
respond to a conventional military attack).  
Further, the paper foresees the creation of a EU fusion cell, with the aim 
of improving the secure exchange of information on hybrid attacks and on the 
vulnerabilities of member states, to improve the cooperation with NATO and to 
increase the strategic communication efforts that seek to combat the information 
component of hybrid warfare.
36
  
The institutionalization of these efforts came through the Foreign Affairs 
Council Conclusions of June 2015, which addressed the topic of security and 
defense with the NATO Secretary General.
37
 This represented the preliminary 
for the April 2016 Communication by the European Commission and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,  entitled Joint 
Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response.
38
 It 
constitutes the roadmap for the EU's policies against hybrid threats and is 
divided in five chapters and 22 actions. Three implementation reports have been 
                                                                                                                   
34  Council of the European Union, “Food-for-thought paper ‘Countering Hybrid Threats’,” 
2015, accessed July 6, 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eeas-csdp-
hybrid-threats-8887-15.pdf.  
35  Council of the European Union, “Food-for-thought paper.” 
36  Ibid. 
37  Council of the European Union, “Outcome of the Council Meeting. 3389th Council 
meeting. Foreign Affairs - 18 May 2015,” 2015, accessed July 13, 2018, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23345/st08966en15.pdf. 
38  JOIN(2016). 
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issued in July 2017, July 2018 and May 2019, which show the progress of the 
Communication’s actions and the areas where improvement is required.
39
  
 The Communication begins with an argument where the concept of 
hybrid threats is defined as the "mixture of coercive and subversive activity, 
conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, 
technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state 
actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of 
formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-
making processes.”
40
 Further, the Communication argues that, while national 
security remains a responsibility of the nation-states, many of the threats that 
these face are common and require a coordinated response, thus paving the way 
for supra-nationalization of policies. The Communication also references other 
EU sectoral strategies such as “the European Agenda on Security, the upcoming 
European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and European 
Defence Action Plan, the EU Cybersecurity Strategy, the Energy Security 
Strategy and the European Union Maritime Security Strategy”,
41
 arguing that it 
represents merely a continuation and deepening of these efforts. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the European Commission adopted a number 
of 22 policy directions and has, over the past three years, worked to implement 
them. They are divided into four main areas entitled: “Recognizing the Hybrid 
Nature of a Threat”, “Organizing the EU response: improving awareness”, 
“Organizing the EU response: building resilience”.
42
 “Preventing, responding to 
                                               
39  European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, “Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union 
response,” 2017, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=GA; European Commission 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint 
Report on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats from 
July 2017 to June 2018,” 2018, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_the_implementation_of_the_joint_framework_on_counter
ing_hybrid_threats_from_july_2017_to_june_2018.pdf; European Commission and the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019 “Report 
on the implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats and the 
2018 Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address 
hybrid threats,” 2019, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ 
files/report_on_the_implementation_of_the_2016_joint_framework_on_countering_hybri
d_threats_and_the_2018_joint_communication_on_increasing_resilien.pdf/ 
40  EC/EEAS, “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.” 
41  Ibid. 
42   European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and  
Security Policy, “Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: ‘Joint 
Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response’,” JOIN(2016) 18 
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crisis and recovering”. The first dimension involves only one policy dimension 
and asks member states to determine their own vulnerabilities through a 
questionnaire addressed to all governments. The second dimension looks to 
improve the awareness of both institutions and the population regarding 
disinformation campaigns and dangerous propaganda, through measures such as 
the establishments of a Hybrid Fusion Cell, improved strategic communication, 
and the analysis provided by the Helsinki Center for combating hybrid threats. 
Building resilience comes next and it involves, according to the European 
Commission, a wide approach to the concept, which includes the resilience of 
institutions, people and critical infrastructures. Finally, on the recovery side, the 
action plan involves establishing operational protocols for crisis management 
and testing them through common exercises with NATO, as well as 
investigating the EU’s military capabilities.  
The differential roll-ut of the policies is presented in Table 1. While some 
began quickly after the adoption of the Communication, others required more 
time for consultation and debate before they could be formalized in official 
legislative acts. For example, the creation of the EastStratcom cell within the 
EEAS was implemented rather quickly, while the creation of a set of indicators 
which detail the vulnerability of critical infrastructures or the creation of 
guidelines for screening foreign investments and the adoption of a regulation on 
it took until 2019. EU-NATO cooperation was strongly increased due to the fact 
that both institutions placed the resurgence of the Russian Federation high on 
the scale of potential threats.  
 Furthermore, the European Commission took separate actions against 
online disinformation. The first step undertaken by the Commission was the 
formation of a High Level Expert Group on fake news. This group aimed to 
analyze the way fake news spread, the roles and the responsibilities of relevant 
actors and to formulate recommendations of how this phenomenon can be fought.
43
 
The report of the High Level working group was issued in March 2018 
and includes a set of analyses and policy recommendations. The report defines 
misinformation and disinformation differently and argues that the first is truly 
dangerous because it constitutes an intentional and clear action with the aim of 
causing a damage or to obtain a profit. The report argues that civil society 
should act as a “watchdog” of democracy (supervising the actions of state and 
private actors) and that, a part of information that is spread is relayed further by 
citizens, especially given the emergence of electronic mass-media. According to 
                                                                                                                   
final, 2016, accessed July 14, 2019,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN. 
43  European Commission, “Next steps against fake news: Commission sets up High-Level 
Expert Group and launches public consultation,” 2017, accessed July 17, 2018, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4481_en.htm. 
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the Report, a better understanding of the phenomenon is necessary before the 
elaboration of a comprehensive response.
44
  
In its next chapter, the report evaluates measures already developed by 
relevant actors in the field such as online platforms as well as by press 
institutions and radio emitters, which strengthened their capacity to verify 
information, either through the creation of specially dedicated offices or through 
establishing a cooperation with fact-checking NGOs. Furthermore, campaigns 
to increase critical thinking and media literacy have been undertaken.
45
  
The Report of the High Level Expert Group was followed by the issuing, 
in 2018, of a Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation
46
 and the 
adoption of a Code of Conduct for online providers.
47
 After defining the 
concepts of disinformation and categorizing its main ways of spreading, the 
Communication presents four main principles which lie at the heart of the 
action against disinformation. These are transparency, defined as a better 
knowledge of the source of information, and the way it is sponsored and 
disseminated, diversity of information, understood as increasing the number of 
the sources of information available to the public, credibility understood as 
flagging false information to deter its spread and inclusiveness, defined as 
employing long-term solutions that involve a wide number of stakeholders.  
The Communication foresees the elaboration of a EU-wide code of 
conduct for online platforms, which would require them to better scrutinize the 
way advertising is paid for and to better identify and close fake accounts, as 
well as to improve users' ability to access a diversity of verified information. 
Further, through the Communication, the Commission foresees a stronger 
cooperation with fact-checkers, better cyber-security tools to more easily 
identify the source of a particular piece of information online, an increase in 
research oriented to new technologies that help with the identification of false 
information, a better coordination between national authorities responsible with 
election management in order to prepare for the 2019 European Elections, the 
improvement of media literacy, including through the formation of an Expert 
                                               
44  European Commission and authors, “A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation: 
Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation,” 
2018, accessed July 13, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-
report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation. 
45  European Commission and authors, “A multi-dimensional approach,” 18.  
46  European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach,” 2018, 
accessed July 13, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
52018DC0236&from=EN. 
47  European Commission, “Code of Practice on Disinformation,” 2018, accessed July 13, 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation. 
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Group and the funding of related projects through Erasmus+ and the support of 
quality journalism.
48
  
The Code of Conduct for online platforms was issued in 2018 and 
includes a set of actions that the signatories commit to, which include limiting 
the possibilities of fake commercial advertising, implementing policies for the 
transparency of the sources of funding for political advertising, including 
single-issue advertising, the identification and banning of automated bots and 
investing in technologies that increase the diversity and the quality of 
information available to consumers.
49
  
 
 
Data Analysis 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, from the twenty-two policy actions which the 
European Union adopted in order to combat hybrid warfare, ten were classified 
as “political” and twelve as “technical”. This classification was done based on 
the nature of the policy field: if a certain policy implied only issues that 
involved increased cooperation between technical authorities, or between expert 
groups, or involved the improvement of technical capabilities of specific 
authorities. Alternatively, policy were classified as “political” when they 
involved the affirmation of identity or the investment in military equipment or 
an affirmation of the values and identity which the European Union desires to 
project. 
Considering the actual policies that the EU institutions adopted, eight 
could be classified as the coordination of inter-governmental cooperation, 
thirteen as action by supra-national institution which did not involve the 
adoption of legislation (while not counted, all the actions performed in the 
struggle against disinformation can also be included here), seven new pieces of 
supra-national legislation were elaborated or adopted and three CFSP/CSDP 
actions were adopted or envisioned.  
Action by supra-national institutions through their internal capabilities 
represented the main policy tools in both the political and the technical areas. 
However, the main difference identified is that in the “political” fields, which 
mostly involved CFSP/CSDP actions, the lead institution was the High 
Representative while in the "technical" fields, actions are mostly driven by the 
                                               
48  European Commission, “Tackling online disinformation.” 
49  European Commission, “Code of Practice on Disinformation, European Commission and 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Report on the 
implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation,” 2019, accessed July 14, 2019, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0012&from=EN.  
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Commission. Furthermore, given that many more “technical” fields fall within 
the scope of the EU’s internal action, a greater number of legislation was 
adopted. One notable exception, which was coded as a “political” field are 
policy actions to combat radicalization, where a directive is being considered. 
Between the two types of fields, the same number of policy actions rely on the 
coordination of inter-governmental cooperation. 
Overall, the data provides a cautious support for the rational choice 
institutionalist approach, given that considerably more legislation and internal 
actions (even if one includes the CFSP decisions adopted through inter-
governmental means under the broad concept of “legislation”) have been 
adopted in “technical” rather than “political” fields. This would support the 
claim that EU institutions have a cautious approach to combating hybrid threats 
and prefer to use this new situation to consolidate policies that had already been 
planned and which are relatively less controversial. This could also be said 
about policies adopted to combat disinformation, which include a broad number 
of stakeholders and which resulted in action which is not based on new 
legislation. Furthermore, the High Representative was the main “spearhead” in 
foreign policy. However, it also preferred to use its own resources to establish 
institutions such as EastStratcom or the Hybrid Fusion Cell, while issues that 
required a broad cooperation by governments were addressed in inter-
governmental formats with the EU taking a more coordinating rather than 
supra-national role.  
Thus, one can argue that the EU institutions are only slowly supra-
nationalizing power and are acting to minimize a backlash from the 
governments of member states. Technical policy fields allow for more support 
to be built, given that transnational expert networks are more easily built by 
supra-national institutions. Even in the face of an external threat, the EU acts 
cautiously to build its own legitimacy and allows political decisions to be made 
by national governments.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
The article argued that the Russian Federation’s new assertiveness has 
been conceptualized by the institutions of the European Union as “hybrid 
warfare” and has been addressed through a series of policy tools which are 
grouped under three main categories: identifying the nature of the threat, 
improving awareness and building resilience and that an analysis of these 
policies offers cautious support for rational-choice instiutionalism. Further, the 
article argued that the EU institutions proceeded cautiously and preferred to 
adopt supra-national policies in areas where this is bound to cause the least 
backlash.  
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Technical policy fields were the preferred area of action of EU 
institutions, which adopted both legislative acts and coordinated a number of 
cooperation initiatives in areas which help improve capabilities and information 
exchange of technical agencies. Alternatively, the EU acted less and less supra-
nationally in traditional areas of state prerogative, such as foreign policy and the 
identification of vulnerabilities, allowing member states to take the lead and to 
report on their own state of preparedness.  
While not decisive, the data collected for this article provides cautious 
support for a rational-choice institutionalist approach, which argues that actors 
seek to minimize risk and maximize benefits and will pursue a “path of least 
resistance” in pursuing their power interest. Alternatively, data has shown that 
while the affirmation of “values” is important for the EU, less has been done to 
concentrate power and more has been allowed to the member states when 
addressing their own vulnerabilities and handling the relation with the Russian 
Federation.  
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Annexes 
 
Table 1 : European Union policies to combat hybrid threats 2016-2019 
Action  Institutional 
actor 
entrusted 
with 
application of 
the action.  
Type of action/ 
Policy field  
State of the 
art in July 
2017 
State of the art 
in July 2018  
State of the art in 
May 2019  
Recognizing the Hybrid Nature of a Threat 
Member States, 
supported as 
appropriate by 
the Commission 
and the High 
Representative, 
are invited to 
launch a hybrid 
risk survey to 
identify key 
vulnerabilities, 
including 
specific hybrid 
related 
indicators, 
potentially 
affecting 
national and 
pan-European 
structures and 
networks. 
 
Member states 
supported by 
the 
Commission 
and the HR 
Coordination of 
intergovernmenta
l cooperation  
 
Political  
The 
“Friends of 
Presidency” 
groups was 
created (an 
ad-hoc 
group 
established 
as a 
preparatory 
body of the 
Council of 
the 
European 
Union) and 
a 
questionnai
re was 
created and 
distributed 
concerning 
the 
vulnerabilit
ies of each 
member 
state.  
  
Plans were 
being put 
forward to 
prolong the 
Mandate of the 
FoP group.  
A summary of the 
findings based on 
24 questionnaires 
was presented 
during the 
Bulgarian 
presidency The 
Mandate of the 
“Friends of 
Presidency” group 
was extended in 
June 2018. 
Organizing the EU response: improving awareness 
Creation of an 
EU Hybrid 
Fusion Cell 
within the 
existing EU 
INTCEN 
structure, 
capable of 
receiving and 
analysing 
classified and 
open source 
information on 
hybrid threats. 
Member 
States are 
invited 
to establish 
National 
Contact 
Points on hybrid 
threats to ensure 
cooperation and 
secure 
communication 
with the EU 
High 
Representative 
and Member 
States  
  
Supra-national 
action - internal 
(action by the 
High 
Representative 
at the EEAS).  
Coordination of 
inter-
governmental 
cooperation.  
  
Political 
The cell 
was created 
at the level 
of INTCEN 
and has 
begun to 
distribute 
analysis, 
including 
the Hybrid 
Bulletin.  
The Cell was operational and 
integrated in the EEEAS. It already 
participated, by disseminating analysis 
products during the PACE17 
exercises.  
.  
The Cell is operational and 
several vacancies need to be 
filled.  
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Hybrid Fusion 
Cell. 
The High 
Representative 
will explore with 
Member States 
ways to update 
and coordinate 
capacities to 
deliver proactive 
strategic 
communications 
and optimise use 
of media 
monitoring and 
linguistic 
specialists. 
The High 
Representative 
 Member 
States  
 
Coordination of 
inter-
governmental 
cooperation 
 
Political  
In 2015, the 
Council of 
the 
European 
Union 
founded 
EastStratco
m which 
aims at 
anticipating 
disinformat
ion and 
negative 
information 
campaigns. 
The website 
euvsdisinfo.
eu was 
released 
and its 
associated 
newsletter 
which 
disseminate
s the results 
identified to 
a wider 
audience.  
  
A new communication was adopted 
“Tackling  online  disinformation:  a 
European approach” 
 in April 2018 EastStratcom continued 
to debunk disinformation from the the 
Russian-speaking media.  
Awareness -raising campaigns and 
cooperation have been undertaken in 
Eastern Partnership countries.  
 
 The  
Action Plan against 
Disinformation was endorsed 
by  
the European  
Council in 
December 2018.  
A Rapid Alert System  
was 
set up to  
enable Mem 
ber States and EU 
institutions  
to  
facilitate sharing of data, 
enable common situational 
awareness, facilitate the 
development  
of common responses, and 
ensure time and resource 
efficiency. 
Member States 
are invited to 
consider 
establishing a 
Centre of 
Excellence for 
‘countering 
hybrid threats’. 
Member states  Coordination of 
inter-
governmental 
action  
 
Political 
 
The Centre 
is based on 
a 
memorandu
m of 
understandi
ng signed 
on 
11.04.2017 
by nine 
countries, 
which were 
joined by 
other three 
at the end 
of the year. 
The Center 
was 
launched in 
Helsinki 
with HR 
Mogherini 
and NATO 
Secretary 
General 
Stoltenberg 
attending 
(EEAS 
2017) 
  
 
16 states have become members of the 
Helsinki CoE.   
Three Communities of Interest: on 
Hybrid Influencing, Vulnerabilit 
ies  
and Resilience and Strategy and 
Defence. A sub-group on non-state 
actors has been established  
 
22 Member States have 
become Members of the 
Helsinki CoE.  
In September 2018, the CoE 
facilitated a scenario 
- 
based discussion at a joint 
meeting of  
the Political and Security 
Committee and the North 
Atlantic Council, which was 
broadly  
appreciated. 
Organizing the EU response: building resilience 
The 
Commission, in 
cooperation with 
The 
Commission  
Supra-national 
action - internal 
(the use of the 
A 
workshop 
on critical 
A draft manual 
of vulnerability 
indicators and 
The list of  
vulnerability  
indicators  
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Member States 
and 
stakeholders, 
will identify 
common tools, 
including 
indicators, with 
a view to 
improve 
protection and 
resilience of 
critical 
infrastructure 
against hybrid 
threats in 
relevant sectors. 
European 
program in order 
to improve 
critical 
infrastructures)  
A better 
application of the 
directive on 
critical 
infrastructure  
 
Supra-national 
action - 
legislation  
 
Technical 
infrastructu
res was 
organized 
and a 
roadmap 
elaborated 
on future 
activities.  
 
resilience 
hybrid threats to 
critical 
infrastructures 
in the EU 
has been 
developed.  
 
A proposal  for 
a  Regulation  
establishing  a  
framework  for  
screening  of  
foreign  direct  
investments 
into the 
European 
Union if they 
are likely to 
affect security 
or public order 
has been 
elaborated.  
  
for the resilience 
and protection of  
critical 
infrastructure 
against  
hybrid  
threats has been 
completed.  
The EU adopted  
Regulation 
(EU) No 2019/452 
11 
setting up a  
framework for the 
screening of 
investments from 
non-EU countries 
that may affect 
security or public 
order. 
 
The 
Commission, in 
cooperation with 
Member States, 
will support 
efforts to 
diversify energy 
sources and 
promote safety 
and security 
standards to 
increase 
resilience of 
nuclear 
infrastructures 
The 
Commission 
Member 
States  
  
Supra-national 
action -legislation 
(a directive will 
be elaborated 
which is to apply 
directly to 
member states)  
 
Coordinating 
inter-
governmental 
cooperation (on 
gas pipelines)  
 
Technical  
Legislation 
was 
elaborated 
on ensuring 
the security 
of gas 
supply, 
which was 
agreed, in 
principle, 
by the 
Council and 
the 
Parliament.  
 In September 
2017, a Joint 
Communication
: “Resilience, 
Deterrence  
and Defence: 
Building strong 
cybersecurity 
for the EU” 
was adopted.  
 
The 
Commission 
will continue  
supporting the 
European 
Energy 
Information 
Sharing and 
Analysis  
Centre on 
cybersecurity. 
 
Member States 
are 
implementing 
the Security of 
Gas  
Supply 
Regulation.  
 
The Risk 
Preparedness  
Regulation, is 
under 
negotiations.  
 
The European  
Parliament and the 
Council  
reached in 
November 2018 
an agreement on 
the 
Commission’s 
Proposal for 
Regulation on  
risk-preparedness 
in the  
electricity  
sector 
 
The Commission  
has been 
also actively  
supporting 
Member  
States in 
the  
implementation of  
Regulation (EU) 
2017/1938 
14 
concerning 
measures to 
safeguard the 
security of gas 
supplies.  
 
The Commission 
will monitor 
emerging threats 
across the 
transport sector 
The 
Commission  
The High 
Representative 
Member 
Supra-national 
action (direct 
action by the 
Commission 
through internal 
A 
methodol
ogy for 
the 
"common 
Risk analyses of 
maritime threats 
are being 
undertaken.  
The Information 
Regulation (EU) 
2019/123 
on the 
implementation of 
Air Traffic Network 
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and will update 
legislation 
where 
appropriate. In 
implementing 
the EU Maritime 
Security 
Strategy and the 
EU Customs 
Risk 
Management 
Strategy and 
Action Plan, the 
Commission and 
the High 
Representative 
(within their 
respective 
compentences), 
in coordination 
with Member 
States, will 
examine how to 
respond to 
hybrid threats, 
in particular 
those 
concerning 
transport 
critical 
infrastructure. 
States  
 
means).  
 
Supra-national 
legislation  
 
Technical 
evaluatio
n of risks 
to be 
undertake
n at the 
EU level" 
was 
elaborate
d with the 
help of 
national 
air 
security 
experts 
and with 
the 
support of 
the 
EEAS. 
This will 
allow the 
exchange 
of 
classified 
informati
on and 
the 
definition 
of a 
common 
vision on 
risk. 
 
Sharing 
Environment is 
being upgraded.  
An action plan 
to improve 
military 
mobility 
through the use 
of the Trans-
European 
network was 
being 
elaborated.  
Functions has been 
adopted. It created 
the 
European Aviation 
Crisis Coordination 
Cell (ECCC). 
The EU  
Maritime Security 
Strategy Action Plan 
has been revised.  
Within the 
context of the 
Space Strategy 
and European 
Defence Action 
Plan, the 
Commission will 
propose to 
increase the 
resilience of 
space 
infrastructure 
against hybrid 
threats, in 
particular, 
through a 
possible 
extension of the 
Space 
Surveillance and 
Tracking scope 
to cover hybrid 
threats, the 
preparation for 
the next 
generation of 
GovSatCom at 
European level 
and the 
introduction of 
Galileo in 
critical 
infrastructures 
The 
Commission  
 
Supra-national 
action (direct 
action by the 
Commission 
through its own 
agencies)  
 
Technical 
No concrete 
action, but 
the issues 
of 
resilience 
will be 
integrated 
in future 
regulation.  
 
.  
The 
Commission 
elaborated a 
Space 
Programme of 
the Union, 
which includes 
aspects to 
increase the 
resilience of 
critical 
infrastructure. 
  
 
Plans to 
implement 
GOVSATCOM - 
a system of 
satellite based 
governmental 
communications 
has been 
elaborated and a 
draft exercise 
project has been 
started.  
 
Given that the HR 
and the Council 
have 
responsibilities for 
the security of 
space assets, the 
HR has elaborated 
hybrid war 
scenarios which 
include attacks on 
the EU's satellites.  
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dependant on 
time 
synchronisation. 
The High 
Representative, 
supported as 
appropriate by 
Member States, 
in liaison with 
the Commission, 
will propose 
projects on how 
to adapt defence 
capabilities and 
development of 
EU relevance, 
specifically to 
counter hybrid 
threats against a 
Member State or 
several Member 
States. 
The High 
Representative  
 
Inter-
governmental 
adoption of EU 
policies (the 
European 
Defense Agency 
is coordinated by 
the HR but is 
overseen by a 
board composed 
of member state 
representatives) 
 
 
Political  
 
 three 
table top 
exercises 
based on 
hybrid 
scenarios  
 The 
inclusion 
of the 
hybrid 
dimensio
n in the 
2005 
Require
ments 
Catalogu
e  
 analysis 
report on 
military 
implicati
ons 
stemmin
g from 
hybrid 
attacks 
directed 
against 
critical 
harbor 
infrastru
cture  
 
The 
Commission 
proposed in  a 
Regulation 
establishing a  
European 
Defence 
Industrial 
Development 
Programme.  
A provisional 
agreement on 
the draft 
Regulation was 
reached on 22 
May 2018 by  
the European 
Parliament and 
the Council. For 
the next EU 
Multiannual 
Financial 
Framework,  
the Commission 
proposed an 
integrated 
European 
Defence Fund 
with an 
ambitious 
budget of  
EUR 13 billion. 
The Council and 
the  
European  
Parliament 
reached a partial 
agreement on the 
Proposal for 
Regulation 
establishing  
the European  
Defence Fund 
for the 2021-2027 
Multiannual 
Financial 
Framework 
.  
The 
Commission, in 
cooperation with 
Member States, 
will improve 
awareness of 
and resilience to 
hybrid threats 
within existing 
preparedness 
and 
coordination 
mechanisms, 
notably the 
Health Security 
Committee. 
The 
Commission  
Member 
States  
  
Supra-national 
action (internal to 
EU institutions)  
 
Coordinating  
inter-
governmental 
cooperation 
 
Technical  
 
 
 A
n exercise 
was 
planned for 
the autumn 
of 2017, 
concerning 
hybrid and 
multi-
dimensiona
l threats  
 A
 common 
action on 
vaccination, 
including 
the 
predictions 
concerning 
the supply 
and demand 
of vaccines 
and the 
research on 
vaccines  
 C
reation of a 
network of 
funders of 
health 
The 
Commission 
organized 
Chimera, an 
exercise for the 
health, civil 
protection and 
security sectors 
throughout the 
EU and third 
countries to test 
preparedness 
and response  
planning to 
serious cross-
border threats.  
.  
 
In April 2018, 
the Commission 
published a 
Communication 
and submitted a 
proposal for a 
Council 
Recommendatio
n to strengthen 
the EU 
cooperation 
against vaccine-
The report on the 
Chimera exercise 
was adopted.  
 
A workshop was 
organized in  
April 2019, in 
cooperation with 
the US Federal 
Bureau of 
Investigation 
(FBI) and  
the US  
Centres for  
Disease Control 
and Prevention 
(CDC),  
 
Decision (EU) 
2019/420 of the 
European 
Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 
March 2019 has 
been adopted.  
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research 
abroad  
preventable 
diseases. 
 
The Commission 
encourages 
Member States 
as a matter of 
priority to 
establish and 
fully utilise a 
network between 
the 28 CSIRTs 
and the CERT-
EU (Computer 
Emergency 
Response Team-
EU) as well as a 
framework for 
strategic 
cooperation. The 
Commission, in 
coordination 
with Member 
States, should 
ensure that 
sectorial 
initiatives on 
cyber threats 
(e.g. aviation, 
energy, 
maritime) are 
consistent with 
cross-sectorial 
capabilities 
covered by the 
NIS Directive to 
pool 
information, 
expertise and 
rapid responses. 
The 
Commission  
Supra-national - 
internal (applying 
the NIS directive) 
 
Supra-national 
action- legislation  
  
Coordinating 
inter-
governmental 
cooperation.  
 
Technical 
  
 A
dopting the 
NIS 
directive in 
2017  
 E
xpansion of 
the mandate 
of the 
ENISA and 
its 
transformati
on in the 
EU cyber-
security 
agency  
 A
 European 
framework 
for 
certifying 
the security 
of cyber-
products.  
 T
he funding 
of cyber 
defense 
projects 
through 
PESCO 
(suggested 
in 
September 
2017 
through the 
State of the 
Union 
Address)  
The European 
Defense 
Agency 
organized 
CYBRID 17, a 
cyber response 
incident 
exercise.  
 
The 
Commission 
monitors the 
way in which 
the NIS 
directive is 
adopted.  
A network of 
Computer 
Security Incidents 
Response Teams 
has been 
established and 
work is 
progressing on 
building trust 
between its 
members and with 
CERT-EU.  
 
The  Commission 
adopted a 
Proposal for 
Regulation to 
establish the 
European 
Cybersecurity 
Industrial, 
Technology and 
Research 
Competence 
Centre and the 
Network of 
National 
Coordination 
Centers. 
 
A Cybersecurity 
Act was adopted 
on 17 April 2019 
The 
Commission, in 
coordination 
with Member 
States, will work 
together with 
industry within 
the context of a 
contractual 
Public Private 
Partnership for 
cybersecurity, to 
develop and test 
technologies to 
better protect 
users and 
infrastructures 
against cyber 
aspects of hybrid 
threats. 
The 
Commission  
 
Supra-national 
action 
(independent 
action by the 
Commission)  
 
Technical  
 
 T
he signing, 
by the 
Commissio
n, of a 
public-
private 
partnership 
for cyber-
security  
 
The 
Commission 
signed a public-
private 
partnership on 
cybersecurity 
with the 
European 
Cybersecurity  
Organisation  
(ECSO). 
 
The Joint 
Communication 
on Resilience, 
Deterrence and 
Defence: 
Building strong 
cybersecurity in 
Europe was 
adopted.  
 
A  
European 
Cybersecurity 
Industrial, 
Technology and 
Research 
Competence  
Centre is being 
planned.  
The Commission 
will issue 
guidance to 
The 
Commission  
 
Supra-national 
action 
(independent 
Planning a 
sectoral 
strategy on 
The 
Commission 
will establish an 
 In April 2019, the 
Commission 
adopted a 
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smart grid asset 
owners to 
improve 
cybersecurity of 
their 
installations. In 
the context of 
the electricity 
market design 
initiative, the 
Commission will 
consider 
proposing 'risk 
preparedness 
plans' and 
procedural rules 
for sharing 
information and 
ensuring 
solidarity across 
Member States 
in times of crisis, 
including rules 
on how to 
prevent and 
mitigate cyber-
attacks. 
action by the 
Commission)  
 
Technical  
cyber-
security in 
the field of 
energy 
(where 
smart 
networks 
have 
appeared)  
 
energy sectoral 
work stream 
under  the NIS 
Cooperation 
Group to 
address the 
particularities 
of the energy 
sector and to 
provide 
guidance to 
Member States 
on the 
implementation 
of the NIS 
Directive 
Recommendation 
on cybersecurity 
in the energy 
sector.  
 
The 
Commission, in 
cooperation with 
ENISA,  Member 
States, relevant 
international, 
European and 
national 
authorities and 
financial 
institutions, will 
promote and 
facilitate threat 
information-
sharing 
platforms and 
networks and 
address factors 
that hinder the 
exchange of 
such 
information. 
The 
Commission  
Supra-national 
action 
(elaborating a 
legislative 
framework 
applicable to all 
member states 
and 
Commission’s 
independent 
action)  
 
Technical  
 
 Modify
ing the 
Directi
ve on 
Payme
nt 
Service
s  
 Elabor
ating 
minima
l 
technic
al 
standar
ds on 
the 
strict 
authent
ication 
of 
clients 
and the 
secure 
commu
nicatio
n of 
payme
nts.  
 
The Fintech 
action plan 
was 
elaborated. to 
eliminate 
barriers that 
limit 
information 
exchange 
between 
market 
players.  
.  
The Commission 
and the High 
Representative 
(within their 
respective areas 
of competence), 
in coordination 
with Member 
States, will 
The 
Commission  
The High 
Representative  
  
Supra-national 
action (internal 
action of supra-
national 
institutions) 
 
Technical  
 
 
 E
laborating 
the 
common 
research 
agenda of 
the 
commissio
n and the 
CERT-EU has 
signed a Service 
Level 
Agreement with 
EUROCONTR
OL and a 
Memorandum 
of Cooperation 
with the 
The the 
European 
Aviation  
Safety Agency 
(EASA) is s 
currently 
developing the 
European Centre 
for Cyber Security 
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examine how to 
respond to 
hybrid threats, 
in particular 
those 
concerning 
cyber-attacks 
across the 
transport sector. 
EEAS  
 T
he capacity 
to handle 
hybrid 
threats by 
national 
authorities 
with 
coastguard 
functions 
was 
analyzed 
and 
measures to 
increase 
cooperation 
were 
suggested  
European 
Aviation Safety 
Agency  
 
in Aviation 
(ECCSA), which 
is currently in its 
pilot phase. 
 
The Commission 
is working on 
transposition of 
the new 
International  
Civil Aviation  
Organization 
(ICAO)  
cybersecurity 
standard 
to the Aviation 
Security 
Implementing 
Regulation. 
 
Implementation of 
EU Maritime 
Security  
Strategy Action 
Plan 
concerning 
preparedness and 
response to hybrid 
threats, in 
particular to  
cyber 
attacks across the 
transport sector 
in ongoing. 
The Commission 
will use the 
implementation 
of the Action 
Plan on 
Terrorist 
Financing to 
also contribute 
to countering 
hybrid threats.  
The 
Commission  
 
Supra-national 
action - 
legislation (the 
elaboration of a 
supra-national 
framework, the 
elaboration of 
implementation 
standards).  
 
Technical 
 
 t
hree 
legislative 
proposals 
on the 
introducti
on of 
criminal 
sanctions 
in the case 
of money 
laundering 
and illicit 
cash 
payments, 
concernin
g the 
freezing of 
assets and 
the 
confiscati
on of 
goods  
 t
he 
monitorin
g of the 
transpositi
on of the 
fourth 
Directive 
on the 
A proposal for 
a Directive 
was launched 
to  
to step up the 
cooperation 
between the  
authorities 
responsible for 
combating 
serious crime 
and terrorism 
and to enhance 
their access to  
and use of 
financial 
information. 
 
The 5th Anti- 
Money  
Laundering 
Directive was 
adopted. 
The 
implementation 
of the 5th anti-
money 
laundering 
directive is 
ongoing.  
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combating 
of money 
laundering
.  
 a
 legislative 
proposal 
to 
consolidat
e the 
directive 
with 
supplemen
tary 
measures.  
 a
 regulation 
proposal 
with the 
aim of 
preventing 
the import 
and the 
storage in 
the EU of 
cultural 
assets 
illegally 
exported 
from other 
countries.  
The Commission 
is implementing 
the actions 
against 
radicalisation 
set out in the 
European 
Agenda on 
Security and is 
analysing the 
need to reinforce 
procedures for 
removing illegal 
content, calling 
on 
intermediaries' 
due diligence in 
managing 
networks and 
systems. 
 
The 
Commission  
 
Supra-national 
action (internal 
action of supra-
national 
institutions);  
 
Adoption of 
supra-national 
legislation  
 
 
Political 
 
 The 
develop
ment of 
the 
Radicali
zation 
Awarene
ss 
Network
.  
 Developi
ng the 
EU 
Internet 
Referral 
Unit at 
Europol, 
and the 
EU 
Internet 
Forum  
 Elaborati
ng a 
code of 
Conduct 
for 
counteri
ng 
illegal 
hate 
speech 
online 
 
The 
Commission 
has launched an 
impact 
assessment to 
determine 
whether current 
efforts are 
sufficient or 
whether 
additional 
measures are 
needed.  
  
The Commission 
adopted a 
Proposal for 
Regulation to 
prevent the 
dissemination of 
terrorist content 
online.  
 
The European 
Strategic 
Communications 
Networks working 
on the issue of 
disinformation 
and its  
implications. 
The High 
Representative, 
The High 
Representative  
Supra-national 
action (internal 
 a study 
on risks 
Dedicated 
Hybrid Risk 
Hybrid Risk 
Surveys have been 
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in coordination 
with the 
Commission, 
will launch a 
hybrid risk 
survey in 
neighborhood 
regions. The 
High 
Representative, 
the Commission 
and Member 
States will use 
the instruments 
at their 
respective 
disposal to build 
partners' 
capacities and 
strengthen their 
resilience to 
hybrid threats. 
CSDP missions 
could be 
deployed, 
independently or 
to complement 
EU instruments, 
to assist 
partners in 
enhancing their 
capacities. 
The 
Commission  
 
action of supra-
national 
institution)  
Inter-
governmental 
adoption of EU 
policies (a 
possible CSDP 
mission). 
 
Political  
 
 
 
elaborat
ed in 
the 
framew
ork of a 
pilot- 
project 
develop
ed 
together 
with the 
Republi
c of 
Moldov
a with 
the aim 
of 
identifyi
ng the 
country'
s main 
vulnera
bilities 
and to 
ensure 
that the 
EU 
targets 
the 
specific 
fields  
 further 
recomm
endatio
ns on 
the 
basis of 
this 
research
.  
 Progra
m on 
the 
cyber 
resilienc
e of 
third 
countrie
s.  
 
Surveys are 
being 
launched to 
identify the 
critical  
vulnerabilities 
and provide 
targeted 
support for 
EaP countries.  
These surveys 
have been 
used in 
Republic of 
Moldova. In 
2018, Jordan 
and Georgia 
have  
officially 
requested the 
EU to undergo 
vulnerability 
surveys.  
 
launched in seven 
partners: Moldova, 
Georgia, Jordan, 
Albania, North 
Macedonia, 
Kosovo and 
Montenegro.  
Preventing, responding to crisis and recovering  
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The High 
Representative 
and the 
Commission, in 
coordination 
with the Member 
States, will 
establish a 
common 
operational 
protocol and 
carry out 
regular 
exercises to 
improve 
strategic 
decision-making 
capacity in 
response to 
complex hybrid 
threats building 
on the Crisis 
Management 
and Integrated 
Political Crisis 
Response 
procedures. 
The High 
Representative  
The 
Commission 
The Member 
States  
  
Supra-national 
action (internal 
action of supra-
national 
institutions)  
The coordination 
of inter-
governmental 
cooperation  
 
 Technical  
 The 
elaboratio
n of the 
EU's 
operationa
l protocol 
on the 
combating 
of hybrid 
threats 
(EU 
playbook).  
 Improving 
the 
synergy 
with 
NATO, 
which has 
elaborated 
a protocol 
on the 
cooperatio
n of the 
EU. 
 Coordinati
ng the 
decision-
making 
procedure 
between 
the two 
institution
s.  
A EU 
operational 
protocol has 
been 
established 
and tested 
during the 
2017 NATO-
EU Parallel 
exercises. 
NATO-EU 
interaction has 
been greatly 
expanded.  
The EU Hybrid 
Exercise 
MULTILAYER 
18 - EU HEX-ML 
18 (PACE) 
 Has been carried 
out on the basis of 
the Playbook.  
The Commission 
and the High 
Representative, 
in their 
respective areas 
of competence, 
will examine the 
applicability and 
practical 
implications of 
Articles 222 
TFEU and 
Article 42(7) 
TEU in case a 
wide-ranging 
and serious 
hybrid attack 
occurs. 
The 
Commission  
The High 
Representative  
  
Supra-national 
action (internal 
action of supra-
national 
institutions)  
 
Political 
When joint 
exercises 
are 
organized, 
of the 
invocation 
of the 
solidarity 
clause by a 
state.  
 
  
The High 
Representative, 
in coordination 
with Member 
States, will 
integrate, exploit 
and coordinate 
the capabilities 
of military 
action in 
countering 
hybrid threats 
within the 
Common 
Security and 
The High 
Representative  
 
Supra-national 
action (internal 
action of supra-
national 
institutions)  
 
Political  
 
Elaborating 
a document 
called  
EU military 
contributio
n to 
countering 
hybrid 
threats 
within the 
CSDP. 
The “EU 
military 
contribution to  
countering 
hybrid threats 
within the 
Common 
Security and 
Defence 
Policy” plan has 
been finalized.  
The Concept 
Implementation 
Plan is being 
elaborated.  
The “EU Concept 
for EU-led 
Military 
Operations and 
Missions” is being 
modified to out to 
include  
hybrid threats 
aspects. 
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Defence Policy 
The High 
Representative, 
in coordination 
with the 
Commission, 
will continue 
informal 
dialogue and 
enhance 
cooperation and 
coordination 
with NATO on 
situational 
awareness, 
strategic 
communications, 
cybersecurity 
and “crisis 
prevention and 
response” to 
counter hybrid 
threats, 
respecting the 
principles of 
inclusiveness 
and autonomy of 
each 
organisation’s 
decision making 
process.  
The High 
Representative  
The 
Commission  
  
The inter-
governmental 
adoption of EU 
policies (the 
Warsaw NATO-
EU declaration 
was adopted by 
the European 
Council)  
 
Political  
A set of 42 
proposals 
was 
elaborated 
and it was, 
subsequentl
y endorsed 
in separate, 
parallel 
processes 
on 6 
December 
2016 by 
both the EU 
and NATO 
Councils.  
 
The first 
exchanges 
were 
carried out 
between 
the NATO 
Hybrid 
Analysis 
Cell and 
the EU 
Hybrid 
Fusion 
Cell.  
 
.  
 
The PACE17 
exercise has 
tested the two  
organisations’ 
‘Playbooks’ 
and, through 
that, their 
capacity to 
work together 
to support their 
members.  
 
Consultations 
on Strategic 
Communication 
have taken 
place support 
for Ukraine, 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
the Republic of 
Moldova and  
Georgia. 
The PACE 2018 
exercise has 
deepened the 
lessons from 
PACE 2017. 
PACE 2018 was 
based on a hybrid 
scenario including 
cyber-security, 
disinformation 
and civil 
protection.  
 
Staff-to-staff 
meetings on 
cyber-security, 
CBRN and 
situational 
awareness.  
Source: This table was constructed through analyzing the following documents: European 
Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
“Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: ‘Joint Framework on 
countering hybrid threats - a European Union response’,” JOIN(2016) 18 final, 2016, accessed 
July 14, 2019,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018 
&from=EN; European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, “Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union 
response,” 2017, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=GA; European Commission and the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Report on the implementation of the Joint 
Framework on countering hybrid threats from July 2017 to June 2018,” 2018, accessed July 14, 2019, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_the_implementation_of_the_joint_frame 
work_on_countering_hybrid_threats_from_july_2017_to_june_2018.pdf; European Commission 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019 “Report 
on the implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats and the 2018 
Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid 
threats,” 2019, accessed July 14, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/report_on_the_ 
implementation_of_the_2016_joint_framework_on_countering_hybrid_threats_and_the_2018_joi
nt_communication_on_increasing_resilien.pdf; European Union and NATO, “Joint declaration by 
the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the 
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 2016, accessed June 13, 2019, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/de/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm; European Union and NATO, 
“Progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and 
EU Councils on 6 December 2016,” 2017, accessed June 13, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
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sites/eeas/files/170614-joint-progress-report-eu-nato-en-1.pdf; European Union and NATO,“Second 
progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and 
EU Councils on 6 December 2016,”  2017, accessed July 2, 2019, http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/media/35577/report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf; European Union and NATO, “Third 
progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and 
EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,” 2018, accessed June 13, 2018, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35578/third-report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf. 
 
 
Table 2 - Synthetic analysis of European Policies for combating hybrid threats 
Field Type of action  
Political (10 fields) 4 Coordination of inter-governmental 
cooperation 
5 Supra-national action - internal 
1 Supra-national action - legislation  
3 Inter-governmental adoption of EU policies  
Technical (12 fields)  4 Coordination of inter-governmental 
cooperation  
9 Supra-national action - internal 
6 Supra-national action - legislation  
 
 
 
